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Dec., 1953
CONFLICT OF LAWS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
ELECTIONS
ALLEN P. MITCHEM of the Denver Bar
CONFLICT OF LAWS
With increased mobility in our population, there will inevitably
result an increase in the number of cases involving Conflict of
Law problems. This fact is demonstrated by a pronounced in-
crease in the Conflict of Law cases before the Colorado Supreme
Court during the past year. The principal issues which may be
classified under the heading, Conflict of Laws, are three in num-
ber: (1) When may a court in a given state exercise jurisdiction
in a particular action? (2) What effect must a court in a given
state give to a judicial determination from another state? And (3)
What law will a court in a given state apply to a controversy
which has its roots in some other state?
The conflicts cases which will be reviewed herein deal with
the first and third of these problems, that is, jurisdiction and
choice of law. The cases falling within the first category present
questions of jurisdiction to grant a divorce decree, jurisdiction in
a personal action based on defendants' domicile, jurisdiction to
grant an annulment decree, jurisdiction to enter a judgment for
past due installments for child support, and jurisdiction to issue
letters of administration. The choice of law cases deal with the
law governing the validity of chattel mortgages and the applica-
bility of foreign statutes of limitations. Consideration will first
be given to the subject of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction for Divorce
The United States Supreme Court has, in the famous Williams 1
cases, laid down the rule that no state will have jurisdiction to em-
power its courts to decree a divorce unless one of the parties has
his domicile in that state. In Colorado, by statute, that party must
be the plaintiff, and the plaintiff must have resided within the state
for one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition. In
Lawson v. Lawson,2 the plaintiff in the "divorce action was the wife,
a wife who had lived in this state all her life prior to the fateful
day, May 18, 1951, when she left this state to go to Indiana for the
sole purpose of marrying the defendant, a resident of St. Joseph,
Missouri, who was a soldier stationed in Indiana at a military post.
After the ceremony, the newly married couple journeyed by way
of Dayton, Ohio, to Kansas City where the plaintiff alone took air
passage for Denver. The evidence showed that the defendant did
' Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North Caro-
lina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
-2 ....... Colo .......... 261 P. 2(1167, 1952-53 6 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 1.
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not make a home for his wife, he did not attempt to do so, nor did
he have any thought of doing so. On May 19, 1952, which was one
year and a day after the plaintiff had left Colorado on this matri-
monial venture, this action for divorce was filed by the wife in
Denver.
The District Court, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court,
concluded that it did not have jurisdiction in the divorce action by
reason of plaintiff's failure to establish residence in Colorado for
a period of one year prior to filing the action, and the action was
dismissed.
This decision is apparently based on the presumption that the
domicile of the wife changes to that of her husband by virtue of
marriage. It would seem that very little evidence should be needed
at the present time to overcome this presumption. The common law
view, that the wife could not have a domicile separate from that
of her husband, has been pretty well discarded, and a recent amend-
ment to the Restatement of Conflicts 3 provides that a wife who
lives apart from her husband may establish a separate domicile.
Jurisdiction for Action in Personam
Since the leading case of Milliken v. Meyer,4 it has been recog-
nized that the fact the defendant is domiciled within the state is,
standing alone, sufficient to empower a state to authorize its court
to enter a personal judgment, providing the service used is reas-
onably calculated to give defendant actual notice of the action.
Rule 4 (f) (1) of the Colo. R.C.P. authorizes personal service out-
side the state in such cases.
In Kellner v. District Court,5 the plaintiff sought cancellation
of a contract and damages from a defendant who had admittedly
resided in Denver until he sold his house to plaintiff. Defendant
thereafter, and before this complaint was filed, moved from this
state and went to California where he was personally served a
summons issuing from the Denver District Court. The principal
issue in the case was whether defendant's domicile had changed to
California at the time the action was commenced.
The evidence offered on behalf of defendant to establish de-
fendant's intention to change domicile was abundant. He had se-
cured employment in California, he had bought California auto-
mobile license plates, he had registered to vote in California, and
he had bought town lots there. The Colorado court held that de-
fendant's domicile had changed to California by the time this ac-
tion was commenced, and the District Court therefore had no
jurisdiction. The court placed particular emphasis on the fact that
defendant had become a registered voter in California which was
a criminal offense in that state if the registrant hadn't truthfully
"pledged allegiance" to the state of California.
ISec. 28 (1948 amendment).
4 311 U. S. 457 (1940).




Owen v. Owen e is a case which has caused considerable com-
ment among lawyers in this state. The plaintiff and defendant went
through a marriage ceremony in Texas in 1946, and the husband
(defendant) was at all times a resident of Texas. The plaintiff
brought the action in the Denver District Court to annul the
marriage on the ground that the defendant was mentally incompe-
tent at the time of the ceremony. Service of the summons was made
on the defendant in person in Dallas, Texas. A motion by the de-
fendant to quash the summons and dismiss the complaint had been
sustained by the trial court.
Under Rule 4 (f) (2), the type of service here used would be
sufficient in an action affecting specific statutes or in a proceeding
in rem. The court stated that the state of the domicile of one of
the parties is generally recognized as having jurisdiction for an
annulment of a marriage entered into elsewhere, but that such
jurisdiction may not be exercised on a constructive service upon
the non-resident defendant by publication or personally without the
state. The Colorado court said that a divorce action unquestionably
is an action in rem. 7 While there was little discussion in the case
as to whether an annulment action did affect specific status under
our rules, the effect of the decision seems to be to deny that an
annulment action does so affect ones status, and for jurisdictional
purposes, the annulment action is to be treated as an action in
personam.
If personal service within the State is to be regarded as es-
sential in an annulment action, then such service would seem to be
jurisdictional, and the jurisdiction requirements in an annulment
action would thus be twofold. One of the parties must have a domi-
cile in the State, and the defendant must be personally served
within the state. These jurisdictional requirements are then more
exacting than those in the usual action in personam where out-of-
state service is permissible where it is reasonably calculated to
give the defendant actual notice of the action pending against
him. It is noted that the 1953 Tentative Draft of Amendments to
the Restatement of Conflict Laws, section 115, reaffirms the posi-
tion that "a state has judicial jurisdiction to nullify a marriage
from its beginning under the same circumstances which would
enable it to dissolve the marriage by divorce."
Jurisdiction to Enter Judgment for Past Due Child Support
In the case of Burke v. Burke," a wife had obtained a Colorado
divorce from her husband, in 1935, a decree for custody, and an
........ Colo .......... 257 P. 2d 581, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 19.
In the first Williams case, supra, the Supreme Court said, "We likewise
agree that it does not aid in the solution of the problem presented in this case to
label the 'proceedings as proceedings in rem. Such a suit, however, is not a
mere in personam action .... They involve the marital status of the parties."9 ........ Colo .......... 255 P. 2d 740, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 16.
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order for $30 per month child support. By August 1951, after the
husband had established a residence in California (and the husband
had paid $520 under decree), the husband was $4,305 in arrears.
The wife at that time applied to the Denver District Court to re-
duce the amount of arrears to a judgment, without notice to hus-
band. A judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the amount in ar-
rears was sustained, the court pointing out that since each install-
ment which matures under the decree becomes a final judgment
debt upon which execution may be issued, the judgment entered
below amounted to nothing more than merely a rotation of record
of the amount then due under the original decree. It was a simple
matter of judicial addition, and the husband was not entitled to
any notice.
Jurisdiction for Administration
Wheat v. Delahay 9 presents an interesting problem in juris-
diction to grant letters of administration. In that case two Camp
Carson soldiers were involved in an automibile accident and both
died. An administrator for the estate of Albert, one of the deceased
soldiers, was appointed by the court of his domicile in Georgia.
The widow of Leonard, the other deceased soldier, though she had
a claim for relief against Albert's estate for wrongful death, the
problem was to find jurisdiction in Colorado for the appointment
of a local administrator of Albert's estate so the action could be
maintained in Colorado against such administrator. Such juris-
diction would have been present if Albert had assets in Colorado
at the time of his death. The district court quashed the appoint-
ment of the administrator which had been made by the county
court, and the action was dismissed
While the action might have been disposed of on the ground
that the application for appointment of an administrator was
made more than one year after the death of the decedent, the su-
preme court gave an additional ground for affirming the district
court's opinion in that the decedent, Albert, had no assets in Colo-
rado to justify an appointment of an administrator at the time of
Albert's death. His wrecked automobile was in this state and it
was also claimed by the plaintiff that the decedent Albert's right
of exoneration under his indemnity insurance policy constituted
assets in this state in that the insurance company was amenable
to process in Colorado.
As to the wrecked automobile, the court disposed of that by
saying that when the Georgia administrator for Albert's estate
disposed of the automobile, it was thus out of the reach of Colo-
rado creditors. One might question whether the Court's decision
on this point was satisfactory in view of the usual rule that juris-
diction to grant letters of administration is based on the existence
..-..... Colo .-....... 261 P. 2d 493, 19.52-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 28.
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of assets within the state either at the time of death or at the
time of appointment. 0
In holding that the indemnity policy did not constitute suffi-
cient assets, the county court cited with a approval a Kansas case
wherein the Kansas court said that if such rights constitute assets,
the situs of such assets is at the domicile of the non-resident. Of
course, such assets being intangible, they do not have a "situs" at
all. Under decision of the United States Supreme Court the debt
may be reached by approximate process whereby the debtor (here
the insurance company) may be personally served.1" It would seem
that the court should adopt a liberal policy in granting letters of
administration for the protection and convenience of creditors
within this state. The decision of the court in this case is directly
contrary to that of a well-known Massachusetts case of Gordon v.
Shea,12 wherein, the Massachusetts court said, "When a creditor
is concerned, administration may be granted where a prima facie
case is made out to authorize the granting of administration within
the state. "The object of appointing an administrator is not to de-
termine the rights of parties interested in that estate, but to have
a legal representative of the estate of the deceased within the
Commonwealth, against whom or through whom those rights may
be asserted."
Law Governing Validity of Chattel Mortgages
While the validity of a chattel mortgage as creating interests
in personal property is usually governed by the law of the situs of
the chattel at the time of the execution of the mortgage, in the case
of Trans America Corporation v. Merrion & Wilkins,l3 there arose
a question as to the validity of a mortgage which had been executed
in Oregon, where the chattels, lambs, were located, and the Colo-
rado court said that the mortgage was valid because it was valid
,"under the laws of Oregon and Colorado and the generally recog-
nized rule." It may be assumed that the law with which the court
concerned itself was the law of Oregon, and although Colorado
cases on this point bs well as upon the question of a subsequent
waiver of the mortgage lien would seem to have no application, sev-
eral cases were cited and relied upon.
A second chattel mortgage case involved the interpretation
of Colorado's rather new Certificate of Title Act for Motor Ve-
hicles. This was the case of Bank of Ogallala v. Chuck Lowen, Inc.'
4
Among other things, this Act provides that no mortgage on a
motor vehicle which has been recorded in any other state shall
be recognized as valid and enforceable against subsequent pur-
chasers, creditors, or mortgagees having no actual notice thereof,
except where the certificate of title bears some notation thereon
10 Restatement of Conflicts, sec. 467 (a).
11 Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215 (1904).
"300 Mass. 95, 14 N.E. 2d 105 (1938).
S........ Colo .......... 255 P. 2d 391, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 11.
........ Colo ........ ,261 P. 2d 158, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 28.
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of the outstanding security interest. The Act also provides that
no person shall sell a vehicle without delivering to the purchaser
a certificate of title, and that no purchaser shall acquire any right,
title, or interest in a vehicle unless he obtains a certificate of title.
An exception to this latter provision exists where a dealer, licensed
in Colorado, sells a new car. Such dealer may transfer title by
bill of sale.
In the Bank of Ogallala case, a Nebraska dealer, after receiv-
ing a manufacturer's certificate of origin for a Packard, mortgaged
the car to the Nebraska bank, delivering to the bank the certificate
of origin. This mortgage was not recorded, but under Nebraska
law recording was not necessary to protect the interest of the
mortgagee who had received and retained the certificate of origin.
The Nebraska dealer subsequently sold the Packard to Chuck
Lowen, Inc., stating that the car was free of encumbrances, and
giving Lowen an ordinary bill of sale. Lowen thereafter, sold the
car to a Colorado purchaser giving a dealer's bill of sale. This
action was commenced by the Nebraska bank against Chuck Lowen
for conversion, the bank contending that as Chuck Lowen acquired
no interest in the car, his sale to the purchaser was a conversion.
A summary judgment for defendant in the trial court was re-
versed.
The Supreme Court held that, under the Colorado statute,
Chuck Lowen acquired no title to the car, having obtained no cer-
tificate of title from the Nebraska dealer, and that the exception
permitting use of a bill of sale when a car is obtained from a dealer
did not apply here, because a "dealer" within the meaning of this
exception is a dealer licensed in Colorado.
The court further held that the interest of the Nebraska bank
as mortgagee would be recognized in this state, even though the
mortgage had not been recorded in Nebraska. The court said that
it was not the recording in Nebraska that would affect the validity
of the mortgage, but the existence of a notation of the mortgage
on the certificate of title. Here there was no such notation, in fact,
Lowen did not receive a certificate of title, therefore, the interests
of the Nebraska mortgage should be recognized in this state as a
matter of comity.
Applicability of Foreign Statutes of Limitation
There were two conflict cases decided during the year involving
the application of statutes of limitation of other states. Of course,
the statutes of limitations of other states will have no operation
in Colorado courts in most instances, since they are usually pro-
cedural. However, in those circumstances where the foreign limi-
tation is substantive, it will bar an action in any state. Also, even
procedural limitations of other states may be applicable in Colo-
rado by virtue of our borrowing statute,15 which provides that an
1 C.S.A., c. 102, Sec. 17.
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action arising in another state shall not be maintained in this
state if it could not be maintained in the state wherein it arose.
The two cases previously referred to involve an application of this
borrowing statute.
In Trans America Corp. v. Merrion & Wilkins,16 an Oregon
mortgagor had contracted to sell a number of mortgaged lambs
to the defendant, without first having obtained permission from
the mortgagee, in whose shoes the present plaintiff stood. Pursuant
to this contract with defendant, the lambs were delivered by the
mortgagor to a carrier in Meacham, Oregon, f.o.b., for shipment
to defendants in Ogden, Utah. Emphasis was placed on the fact
that all freight charges were paid by the defendant. The lambs
were delivered to the carrier August 8, 1940, and received by
defendants at Ogden, Utah, on August 10. Plaintiff, as mortgagee,
brought this present action for conversion of the lambs. Defendant
pleaded a three year statute of limitations of the State of Utah.
The court held that the conversion took place in Oregon and
not Utah, for the delivery of the lambs to the carrier in Oregon
was delivery to the agent of defendant. The cause of action having
accrued in Oregon, the Utah statute of limitations would have no
application. No Oregon statute of limitations was mentioned in
the opinion.
It should be noted that even had the conversion taken place
in Utah, the Utah statute of limitations, being procedural, would
not by its own force be controlling in a Colorado court, but only by
virtue of the Colorado borrowing statute, and this Colorado statute
was nowhere mentioned in the opinion.
The second case involving statutes of limitations is Smith v.
Kent Oil Co. 7 An action had been commenced in the Denver District
Court in February, 1946, on a note executed and payable in Kansas
more than six years earlier. The defendant pleaded the statute of
limitations apparently without designating which statute or which
limitation he was relying upon.
The court affirmed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, hold-
ing that sec. 17, Colorado's borrowing statute, would not aid the de-
fendant, for there was no plea nor proof of any bar by the laws of
Kansas where the claim arose, and the court could not take judicial
notice of Kansas statutes or presume that they were the same as
Colorado statutes.
The most difficult problem for the court to dispose of was
whether a local statute of limitations of Colorado barred the a-
tion. Section 18 provides a six year limitation for actions com-
menced in Colorado courts and which arose outside the state. How-
ever, the court said that this section must be construed together
with our tolling statute, section 27, and that the six year period
' upra, n. 13.
1-7------.Colo . ........ 261 P. 2d 149, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 27.
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described in section 18 did not commence to run until the defend-
ant came into the state.
It wasn't shown in this case when defendant came into the
state; however, there was evidence that he was still in Kansas
within four years of the commencement of the action in Colorado.
Consequently, the defendant had not brought himself within any
permissible limitation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The case of Prouty v. Heron "s presents the question of the
power of the legislature to place limitations on the profession of
an engineer by classifying him as a civil engineer after he had
previously been licensed as an engineer without such restriction.
The case also involves the validity of a statute empowering a state
board to make such classifications.
The court held that the legislature has no power by statute
to abridge the valuable property right, of one who has qualified for
admittance and license to practice engineering without restric-
tion, "in any manner except for cause and after due notice and a
fair and impartial hearing before an unbiased tribunal." The Court
here used rather strong language. It would seem that an abridge-
ment of such property right could conceivably be a legitimate
exercise of the state's police power. At least the case will bear
careful scrutiny by attorneys who have been asked and may be
asked in the future to subscribe to a program of compulsory bar
integration.
It appears, however, that the court's strong language on the
subject of the legislative power was unnecessary to the decision
of the case, for the court further held the statute in question un-
constitutional, because of an illegal delegation of legislative power
to the state board. The statute contained no definition of any par-
ticular branch of engineering and fixed no standards by which
the classifications were to be made. The entire basis for classifica-
tion was left by the statute to the board's own discretion.
In Hazlet v. Gaunt,19 the plaintiffs, citizens and taxpayers,
challenged the validity of the 1949 School District Reorganization
Act contending (1) that, as the Act permitted existing districts
to be dissolved and incorporated into larger, newly formed dis-
tricts against the wishes of the majority of citizens in the old
district, there was a violation of the right of due process of law;
and (2) that the Act contained an illegal delegation of legislative
power.
As to the first contention, the court held that consent of
neither the districts nor the inhabitants thereof is a prerequisite
to changing the boundaries or dissolution of school districts, or to
the transfer of assets from an existing district to a new and larger
Is ........ Colo -......... 255 P. 2d 755, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh, No. 14.
"9126 Colo. 385, 250 P. 2d 18R (1952).
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district. The control of school districts and school property is in
the state, and individual taxpayers have no such property interests
in school assets as is protected by the U. S. Constitution against
deprivation thereof without due process of law.
In so far as the alleged unlawful delegation of powers is con-
cerned, the court found that section 12 of the Act set up sufficient
standards for the guidance of those authorized to administer the
law and that due to the fact that the legislature has almost un-
limited power under our constitution over such districts, it could
delegate broad discretionary powers to administrative bodies to
be exercised under the conditions and in agreement with the type
of standards here set forth.
Sovereign Immunity
Two cases presented the question of immunity of the State
Highway Department from suit in controversies arising out of
contracts to which the Highway Department was a party. The
first was Boxberger v. State Highway Department,20 where the
plaintiff, after executing a deed to the Highway Department of
access rights to and from a portion of his farm brought an action
to cancel the deed and for a declaration that it was void because
of alleged misrepresentations and mutual mistake. A motion to
dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity was granted by the trial
court, but the Supreme Court reversed, saying that plaintiff's
claim was founded upon his constitutional right not to be deprived
of his property without due process of law or without just com-
pensation; that the courts are open to afford that protection to
citizens whether their rights have been invaded by individuals or
any branch of government; that the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity is not applicable in such case; and the action can be main-
tained.
In the second case, State Highway v. Dawson,2 the plaintiff
brought an action against the department to recover the agreed
price for gravel taken from plaintiff's land. Funds had been ap-
propriated and "ear marked" for the particular project, and the
principle contention of the state was immunity from suit. The
court felt that its opinion in the Boxberger case disposed of this
contention and that neither the state nor any of its departments
should be allowed to have its cake and eat it too.
Statutes
A decision of particular interest to attorneys is that concern-
ing Interrogatories from the House of Representatives 22 relative
to the validity of legislation enacting the Colorado Revised Statutes
of 1953 as the statutory law of the state and repealing all statutes
" 126 Colo. 438, 250 P. 2d 1007 (1952).
126 Colo. 490, 253 P. 2d 593 (1952).
........ Colo .......... 254 P. 2d 853 (1952-53), C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 13.
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of a general nature not included therein.
The most serious doubts on the part of legislators related to
the constitutional requirement that no bill shall be passed contain-
ing more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its
title. The court disposed of this matter by saying that such con-
stitutional limitations were designed for the enactment of new
laws and the repeal or amendment of existing laws and have no
application to general revisions of existing law.
The effect of the new statutes then will be not merely evidence
of the law, but the law itself. So for the first time in Colorado his-
tory, the practicing attorney will be safe in disposing of his 19th
century session laws.
Pari-Mutuel Racing
In Ginsberg v. Centennial Turf Club,'23 the Supreme Court up-
held the validiity of the pari-mutuel racing statute of 1949 against
a contention that it was a violation of section 2, Article XVIII of
the Colorado Constitution which prohibits lotteries or gift enter-
prises. The court recognized that both lotteries and pari-mutuel
betting are forms of gambling, but took the position that pari-
mutuel betting was not itself a lottery. The distinction drawn be-
tween the two was that a lottery was based entirely upon chance
whereas a patron of the tracks might make a more or less informed
selection of his animal. For those whose experience is such that
this distinction fails to convince, the court points to the rule that
all doubts are resolved in favor of the validity of a legislative act.
Elections
In Swanson v. Prout,24 the court held that the activities which
take place at a meeting of the electors of school districts in voting
on a proposed consolidation of school districts do not constitute
an "election" within the meaning of statutes governing election
contests. Consequently, the county court, being a court of limited
jurisdiction, has no authoritiy to hear a case involving the resolu-
tion of the voting at such meeting. Such controversy is not an elec-
tion contest.
Cox v. Starkweather 25 deals with the eligibility of a person
elected as County Commissioner to hold such office. Section 10,
Article XIV, of the Colorado Constitution provides that no person
shall be eligible for any county office unless he shall be a qualified
elector. To be a qualified elector the statutes require, among other
things, that the person must have resided in the ward or precinct
for 15 days. A fair inference to be drawn from other statutes is
that the County Commissioners must reside within the district
which they represent.
126 Colo. 471, 251 P. 2d 926 (1952).
2 --------.Colo.-., 259 P. 2d 280,1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 24.
........ Colo ...... *.., 260 P. 2d 587, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 27.
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This case presents the problem of whether a candidate for the
office of County Commissioner must be a qualified elector in the
district which he seeks to represent at the time of the election or
whether it is sufficient that he be a qualified elector in such dis-
trict at the time he takes office. The court held that eligibility was
to be determined at the later time and whether or not the candi-
date was qualified at the time of election was immaterial.
The case of People v. Proposed Toll Gate Sanitation District,-"
decided June 1, 1953, presents a problem of interpretation of a
confusion in the legislation relating to the formation of sanitation
districts. The court found the 1949 statute quite inadequate in that
it purported to repeal former legislation and re-enact parts of the
former statutes. Apparently the newer statute left out a great
many of the procedural steps in organizing such districts. The
organization of the Toll Gate Sanitation District was challenged
on various grounds relating to the conduct of the election which
proported to give rise to it. The court held that the election was
improper and that the order of the District Court establishing the
district should be set aside, holding that under the 1949 Act no
elector is qualified to vote in such election unless he resides in
the district, and the fact that the elector paid taxes on the prop-
erty within the district was not sufficient.
The court further held that an elector was not qualified to
vote in such election merely because his or her spouse paid taxes
on property within the district. And, finally the court held that
printed ballots used in the election which were designated as
"Official Ballots" were improper in that the statute contained no
nomination procedure and that the legislation apparently contem-
plated the use of a blank ballot.
From the language which the court used in discussing the con-
fused state of legislation, it is apparent that there is definite need
for legislative clarification on this problem.
........ Colo .......... 261 P. 2d 152, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 23.
A CLAUSE OF A LAWYER'S WILL
Here is a clause for your own will or codicil:
"I hereby give and bequeath to THE COLORADO BAR
FOUNDATION, Inc., a Colorado not for profit corporation,
the sum of $ -------.........-------- ,to be used by it for its general
purposes."
Your own interest in the activities of the Foundation
will help you to determine the appropriate figure to put in
the blank after the dollar sign.
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